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During the last twenty years the share of researchers in the workforce has
been rising in OECD countries. The consistency of this pattern suggests
that it is not a transitional phenomenon. This paper demonstrates that
the rise of research can occur in the steady state when schooling inequal-
ity is declining. Comparative static analysis of a semi-endogenous growth
model with a continuous distribution of skills shows that a reduction in
skill inequality can have a variety of eﬀects, which includes a rising share of
researchers.
Additionally, the height of the growth rate of mean educational attain-
ment is shown to have a positive eﬀect on the proportion of researchers in
the workforce, without causing it to grow.
Keywords: Schooling inequality; Economic growth
JEL classiﬁcation: O40, I20, J24
1 Introduction
The number of researchers in the OECD has been growing at a higher rate than
the OECD’s workforce. Figure 1 displays summary statistics on the number of re-
searchers measured in FTE relative to total employment for the last twenty years.
A clear upward trend is visible in both the mean and median. Jones (2002) has
argued that the upward trend is a reﬂection of transitional dynamics stemming
from the rise in the years of schooling (ﬁgure 2). This paper proposes an alterna-
tive explanation for the rise of research, which builds on another empirical trend:
the decline in schooling inequality. Figure 3 displays the evolution of the propor-
tions of the population that have primary, secondary, and tertiary education as
the highest completed level of education. Both the rise of tertiary education and
the decline of primary education have contributed to a greater equality in educa-
tional attainment. The decline in schooling inequality has also been reported by
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Figure 1. Number of researchers (FTE) in percentage of total employment; data
have been interpolated at the country level
Sources: OECD (MSTI); World Bank (WDI)
Ram (1990), who ﬁnds that there exists an inverse relationship between schooling
inequality and the average years of schooling if the average years of schooling in a
country exceeds seven.
This paper addresses the consequences of the decline in schooling inequality
on research and economic growth. A simple semi-endogenous growth model is
presented in which workers diﬀer in their education, or, more precisely, they diﬀer
in their skills. The model deviates from other models of economic growth in
that it avoids the customary low-skill – high-skill dichotomy. Instead, skills are
continuously distributed over workers. There are two kinds of jobs in the economy:
jobs in the production sector and jobs in the research sector. In both types of jobs,
workers with higher skills are more productive and receive a higher income. What
distinguishes the two jobs from each other is that productivity is more sensitive
to skills in research than it is in production. In other words, the ‘superstar-eﬀect’
is stronger in research (Rosen 1981).
A change in the distribution of skills inﬂuences the proportion of researchers in
the workforce through two channels. First, a change in the skill level of a worker
changes the comparative advantage she has in her current job. A worker employed
in the production sector, for example, might be more inclined to choose a job in
research if her skills increase. I will refer to this as the ‘skill’ eﬀect.
Second, a change in the distribution of skills will alter the amounts of aggregate
human capital available for production and for research. In general this will lead
to either over- or under-investment in research, such that the wage rates of both
sectors will change. The change in wages induces a change in the proportion of
researchers. I will refer to this as the ‘wage’ eﬀect.


























































Figure 2. Years of higher schooling per capita (OECD)





























































Figure 3. Proportion of population above 25 with primary, secondary, or tertiary
eduction as the highest level of eduction completed (OECD)
Sources: Barro and Lee (2000); World Bank (WDI)
3and ‘wage’ eﬀects. The direction of the two eﬀects depends on parameter settings.
Furthermore, the eﬀects may or may not work in the same directions, such that a
change in schooling inequality can have a variety of steady state eﬀects – amongst
which a rise in the proportion of researchers.
When parameters are such that a reduction in inequality leads to a rise in the
proportion of researchers, a higher level of welfare is not guaranteed. Although
the reduction in inequality might induce more workers to become a researcher, it
also has a negative eﬀect on their productivity – provided that average skills are
kept constant. The latter eﬀect follows almost by deﬁnition: a mean-preserving
decline in skill inequality can only be achieved by ‘transferring’ skills from high
skilled workers to low skilled workers.
A second result is related to the growth in the average years of education.
Advances in schooling induce economic growth, not only in the trivial way of
raising productivity per worker, but also because they stimulate research in the
same way as population growth does. A higher rate of growth in the average years
of schooling leads to a higher – but constant – share of researchers in the workforce.
Because of the latter eﬀect, consumption per capita grows at a higher rate than
the productivity of production workers does. This results has been established
earlier by Arnold (1998).
The setup of the model presented below diﬀers from that of Jones (2002)
in several respects. First, the model allows for changes in the distribution of
skills whereas all workers are equally capable in Jones’ model. Second, Jones
treats the process of education in some detail, while here educational attainment
is exogenous.1 Third, Jones does not provide a micro-foundation for his model.
Finally, Jones takes into account knowledge spillovers.
With regard to the explanation for the rising share of research in employment,
this paper deviates from Jones’ paper in that a constant growth rate in average
education does not cause the proportion of researchers to grow over time. Instead,
the rising share of research is shown to be a possible consequence of a reduction
in schooling inequality.
Besides Jones, several other authors have taken the rise in educational attain-
ment as a starting point for explaining economic growth. The most well-known
contributions in this direction are the endogenous growth models by Lucas (1988).
After Lucas, the theoretical literature of the 1990s – with the exception of Barro,
Mankiw, and Sala-i Martin (1995) – has largely ignored the eﬀects of education on
economic growth. Interest in the topic revived with the paper by Bils and Klenow
(2000). In the model by Bils and Klenow the capability of teachers is larger when
they are better educated themselves. In this way, young teachers will be more
capable than old ones and, consequentially, human capital will accumulate and
productivity will grow. The model by Jones builds on that of Bils and Klenow
but is augmented with intertemporal knowledge spillovers.
As the current paper deals with the consequences of changes in the distribution
of skills, it is also related to the literature on skill biased technological change and
to the literature on job assignment and occupational choice. The ﬁrst strand of
1Appendix A treats endogenous education.
4literature has been surveyed by Acemoglu (2002). Although the model presented
here does show that a rise in the ‘college-premium’ can be a consequence of a
more equal distribution of skills, it does not really ﬁt into this literature because
it does not incorporate skill biased technological change. Laitner (2000) studies
the relation between the distribution of ‘natural abilities’ and wage inequality
using a model with unbiased – but exogenous – technological change.
The assignment of jobs to workers is very simple in the model presented be-
low. There are just two kinds of jobs and skills are one-dimensional. The literature
on assignment and occupational choice contains many more advanced conﬁgura-
tions (Sattinger 1993). The approach followed by Teulings (1995) is particularly
interesting in the context of the model presented here. In his model both the
complexity of jobs and the skills of workers have a continuous distribution.
After the basic model has been presented in section 2, its steady state will
be solved for in section 3. Particular attention is given to the eﬀects of growth
in the average skill level. Section 4 contains a discussion of how changes in the
distribution of skills aﬀect the job choice of individual workers as well as the
economy as a whole. Section 5 summarizes the ﬁndings.
2 The model
Let L be the set of all workers and order the workers according to their skills.
Skills, denoted by k, are one-dimensional, implying that they reﬂect some general
notion of intelligence or capability. The workers are indexed from 0 to L, where
L is both the worker with highest skills and the total amount of labor. The skills
of worker i depend on his relative ranking, i/L, and on the parameters s and σ
(s,σ > 0).
k (i) = (σ + 1)s(i/L)
σ (1)














The chosen speciﬁcation of k has the advantage that changes in σ do not aﬀect
average skills. The shape of the distribution of k can be altered by varying σ
without having to worry about changes in the mean of the distribution. This
distribution can be derived in a straightforward manner by solving equation 1 for




















2The way in which the distribution of skills is modelled resembles the speciﬁcation of the
distribution of jobs in Dupuy and Marey (2004).
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Figure 4. Density plots for skill distributions
In this last expression, f is the density function. Figure 4 shows the distributions
of k for three values of σ, having s = 1. The ﬁgure illustrates that although
the function in 1 is quite simple, it still allows for a reasonable ﬂexibility in the
distribution of k.
A larger σ causes the maximum skill level to increase, even though s is ﬁxed. A
rise in σ therefore widens the gap between the workers with minimal skills and the
workers with maximal skills. This follows directly from k (L) = (σ + 1)s. Besides





2f (k)dk − s
2 =
σs2
2 + σ−1 (5)
The variance of k is clearly increasing in σ. A rise in σ not only widens the skill-
gap between workers 0 and L, it also raises the variance of the skill distribution.
These two properties of the skill distribution make σ a reasonably appropriate
measure of inequality and whenever I mention ‘inequality’ below, I will implicitly
refer to σ.
Consumers maximize the discounted stream of instantaneous utility using the









Here, instantaneous utility is assumed to equal the log of a consumption index
c. Consumers have the usual CES preferences over n symmetric goods. The
quantity of each good consumed by household j is x(j), such that household j’s
consumption equals c(j) = n
1
γx(j), where γ determines the elasticity of substi-
tution. Because consumption is homogenous of degree one in quantities, we can
6write the aggregate consumption index, C, as a function of the total quantity that




The production of x requires an amount of human capital equivalent to Hx/n
(human capital will be deﬁned later on). Aggregate consumption is therefore a




The ﬂow of new goods depends on the amount of human capital available for
research, Hn.
˙ n = Hn (9)
Entry into the research sector is free, meaning that the value of an invention, v,
equals the wage rate per unit of human capital, wn. Research is funded through
the savings of consumers, who in return get a share of the proﬁts, π, that an
invention generates. The rate of return on investing in research is π/v. The
aggregate Ramsey rule that follows from utility maximization is therefore given
by




Here, ˆ C is the growth rate of consumption and gL is the (exogenous) growth rate
of the workforce (a hat denotes a growth rate; g is reserved for ﬁxed growth rates).
There are two types of jobs in the economy: research jobs and production jobs.
Workers may freely choose which type of job they take, but are assumed to choose
the job that gives them the highest income. Although skills are both valuable in
research and production, they are appreciated diﬀerently. The skills of person i
allow either for a production of hx (i) consumption goods or for the invention of
hn (i) new product designs. Their exact speciﬁcations are
hx (i) = ak (i)
α = a˜ s
α (i/L)
σα (11)
hn (i) = bk (i)
β = b˜ s
β (i/L)
σβ (12)
˜ s ≡ (σ + 1)s,
where a,b > 0 and β > α ≥ 0. The latter condition ensures that the marginal
importance of skills is higher for researchers than for production workers. With
this setup, the people with relatively high skills will end up in research.3 What
remains to be determined – and this amounts to solving the model – is what level
of skills marks the border between production workers and researchers.
3The model can be extended with other types of jobs. The inclusion of, for example, man-
agerial or professional jobs avoids the implication of the model that all the smart people end up
doing research. This modiﬁcation is unlikely to lead to qualitatively diﬀerent outcomes.
7The worker that is indiﬀerent between a production job and a research job is
indexed Lx, such that the workers 0 through Lx produce consumption goods and
the workers Lx through L invent new products. The worker that is indiﬀerent
between production and research, must earn the same income with both kinds of
jobs.
wxhx (Lx) = wnhn (Lx) (13)
Here, wx is wage rate per unit of human capital in production, and wn is the wage
rate per unit of human capital in research. After substitution for hx and hn, the

















The aggregate amounts of human capital can be found by integration over the





























(The constants of integration have been set to zero for convenience.)
The proﬁt value ratio, π/v, follows from the zero proﬁt condition in research,














After substitution for the ratio of wage rates and human capital employed in




(1 − γ)b˜ sβ







Using this last expression the Ramsey rule can be formulated in terms of Lx/L
and L/n.
ˆ C =
(1 − γ)b˜ sβ






+ gL − ρ (19)




ˆ n + ˆ Hx (20)
8The growth rates of ˆ Hx and n can be obtained from 15 and 9 together with 16.
















In the ﬁrst expression, gs is the exogenous growth rate of average skills (endogenous
skill growth is discussed in the appendix). Substitute for ˆ n and ˆ Hx to get the
growth rate of consumption in terms of Lx/L and L/n.
ˆ C =
(1 − γ)b˜ sβ









+ αgs + (σα + 1) ˆ Lx − σαgL (23)
Together, equations 19, 22, and 23 provide suﬃcient information to study the
dynamic behavior of the model.
3 Steady state
Before we proceed with the analysis of the dynamic properties of the model, let
us ﬁrst rephrase the condensed model formed by equations 19, 22, and 23 in order
to reduce its complexity. Deﬁne Λ ≡ Lx/L and λ ≡ sβL/n. It turns out to be
that the steady state of the model coincides with constant values for Λ and λ.
ˆ C =
(1 − γ)b(σ + 1)
β
γ (σα + 1)
Λ
σβ+1λ + gL − ρ (24)









(1 − γ)b(σ + 1)
β




λ + αgs + (σα + 1) ˆ Λ + gL
(26)
After substituting out ˆ C and solving for ˆ Λ, we obtain a system of two equations
in Λ and λ.
ˆ Λ =
(1 − γ)b(σ + 1)
β

























The steady state of this system is characterized by a constant share of pro-
duction workers in the labor force, Λ, and a constant λ. Setting ˆ λ = 0 in 28 and
ˆ Λ = 0 in 27 yields the steady state value of λ as functions of Λ∗, the steady state
9value of Λ (steady state levels carry a star).
λ
∗ =









[(1 − γ)gL + γρ + (γα + (1 − γ)β)gs](σα + 1)
(1 − γ)b(σ + 1)
β Λ
∗−σβ−1 (30)
The ﬁrst expression has been used to simplify the second expression. Equate both
expressions for λ∗ to get a solution for Λ∗ and, after substitution of Λ∗, a solution











(σβ + 1)(βgs + gL)
b(σ + 1)






γ (αgs + ρ)
(1 − γ)(βgs + gL)
￿
(33)
The steady state growth rate of consumption can be retrieved either by sub-






γα + (1 − γ)β
γ
gs (34)
As was to be expected of a semi-endogenous growth model, the growth rate of
consumption in the steady state depends on the growth rate of the population.
A novel feature here is that consumption growth also depends on the growth
rate of average skills. A substantial diﬀerence with the standard semi-endogenous
growth model is that steady state economic growth is also feasible in the absence of
population growth. This is also reﬂected by the fact that Λ∗ is smaller than one if
population growth is zero but skill growth is positive (see equation 31). Even when
the population is ﬁxed, researchers are employed and new products are introduced
to the market. This is why the steady state growth rate of consumption is higher
than the rate of productivity growth in the production sector as long as gs > 0
(remember β > α). However, as both population growth and skill growth are
exogenous, the label ‘semi-endogenous’ is still appropriate. A similar result has
been found by Arnold (1998).
The solution for gC in 34 could also have been found using a shortcut. The
steady state growth rates of ˆ Hx and ˆ n are given by
gHx = αgs + gL (35)
gn = βgs + gL. (36)
Applying these growth rates to equation 20 immediately yields the steady state
growth rate of consumption. Above expressions clearly illustrate that growth in
average skills raises both the productivity of production workers and researchers.
By doing so, advances in education aﬀect economic growth in much of the same
way as population growth does.
104 Schooling inequality
We have seen that a change in the parameter σ alters the shape of the skill dis-
tribution without aﬀecting its mean. The change in the shape of the distribution
is such that a rise in σ always widens the gap between the minimum and the
maximum skill level, while simultaneously increasing the variance of the skill dis-
tribution. A reduction in σ has the reverse eﬀect. This property of σ makes it a
suitable measure of schooling inequality – at least within the context of the model.
The steady state values of λ and Λ have been derived in the previous section.
Equations 31, 32, and 33 show that the steady state values are dependent on σ:
schooling inequality matters for the amount of research being done as well as the
number of product types available for consumption. The fact that σ occurs several
times in each of these equations indicates that the impact of a change in σ is quite
complex. Below we will analyze the eﬀects of a change in σ on the steady state in
three steps.
In the ﬁrst step it will be shown how σ aﬀects the kind of job – production or
research – that is preferred by worker Lx, while keeping the wage rates constant.
This eﬀect of σ on the labor market is labelled the ‘skill’ eﬀect. With the second
step it is shown how the wage rates will adjust after the ‘skill’ eﬀect has taken
place. The adjustment of the wage rates naturally causes workers to reconsider
their job choice. This second eﬀect is labelled the ‘wage’ eﬀect. The third and
last step involves the eﬀect of σ on product variety given that both the ‘skill’ and
the ‘wage’ eﬀect have taken place and the proportion of production workers has
reached the steady state.
The three steps do not reﬂect the transitional dynamics of the model and are
only used to make the comparative static eﬀects of a change in σ more insightful.
The ﬁrst step starts by analyzing how the skills of an individual worker are
aﬀected by inequality, after this the eﬀects on his income are discussed. A change
in the shape of the skill distribution may have a positive or a negative eﬀect on
the skills of person i, depending on his ranking. The skills of person i will increase







This condition is obtained by diﬀerentiating equation 1 with respect to σ. A
graphical representation is given in ﬁgure 5.
A change in skills aﬀects the amount of human capital a worker can supply to
production or research. A worker will be more inclined to do research if wxdhx <
wndhn and he will be more inclined to take a production job if wxdhx > wndhn
(we keep wages ﬁxed for the moment). The change relative attractiveness of the
jobs can be found by diﬀerentiating equations 11 and 12 with respect to k (i). The





















Figure 5. Change in the skills of worker i due to a change in inequality
Income









β−α (σ + 1)s
Figure 6. Eﬀect of skill change on income (constant wages) and skill domain of
worker Lx
A skill level that exceeds this value will encourage workers to do research. If the
skills of a worker are lower than this value, a marginal increase in skills will raise the
attractiveness of a production job. Low-skilled people beneﬁt from a higher skill
level because it makes them more productive in their current occupation. Their
productivity as a researcher remains very low, causing their wage gap between
production and research to widen and not to reduce. The reverse applies to high
skilled production workers. A rise in their skills will reduce the diﬀerence between
their current income and the income that they would earn in research. The ﬁrst
line in ﬁgure 6 shows how the attractiveness of a job depends on the skills of the
worker.
In general, a change skills can either raise or lower the attractiveness of a job
in research, depending on the skill level of the worker. However, there is only
one worker that might actually switch jobs: worker Lx. Can we be more speciﬁc
about the incentives faced by Lx? Fortunately, we can. Use equation 14 to solve
for k (Lx) as a function of the ratio of wages and compare the outcome with the


















This leaves us with the clean result that if the skills of worker Lx increase, then he
will choose to be a researcher; if they decrease, he will choose a job in production.
This is the ‘skill’ eﬀect: after a change in σ, worker Lx can improve his income by
switching jobs because his skill level has changed. Figure 7 contains a graphical
representation of this result. The domain labeled ‘Production’ is where worker Lx
chooses a production job; the domain labeled ‘Research’ is where he chooses to
become a researcher.

















Figure 7. Type of job chosen by worker Lx in response to a rise in inequality
(constant wages)
So far, we have analyzed the eﬀects of a change in inequality keeping wage
rates constant. However, a change in inequality is unlikely to leave wage rates
unaﬀected. The underlying reason is that a change in inequality will aﬀect both
types of human capital. First, there is a direct eﬀect through the presence of σ in
equations 11 and 12. Second, σ is important for the job choice of worker Lx. If
Hx and Hn change, then – in general – there will be over- or under-investment in
research. When this happens a change in wages is required to bring the economy
back to the steady state.
The complexity of the model makes it impractical to discuss the impact of a
change in σ on the wages through its eﬀect on Hx and Hn. In stead, I will discuss
the change in the wage rates using the ratio of wage bills as this is mathematically
more convenient. An expression for the ratio of the wage bills can be derived using













The steady state value of the wage bill ratio follows from substituting Lx/L






γ (αgs + ρ)
(1 − γ)(βgs + gL)
(41)
The convenient property of the wage bill ratio is that it is independent of σ in
the steady state. A change in σ will therefore only have temporary eﬀects on the
wage bill ratio.
If we diﬀerentiate the log of the wage bill ratio in equation 40 with respect to




























































Figure 8. Adjustment of wage ratio to steady state

















I will label the solution to this equality Λ#. There will be at most one solution











are monotonically increasing in Lx/L.
A higher σ causes the wage bill ratio to rise above its steady state value if the
proportion of production workers is lower than Λ#; the wage bill ratio will decline
if Lx/L > Λ#. The ﬁrst line in ﬁgure 8 refers to this partial eﬀect of a change in
σ on the wage bill ratio.
When the wage bill ratio deviates from its steady state value, an adjustment
on the labor market needs to take place to reach the steady state again. Suppose
a rise in inequality leads to an increase in the wage bill ratio, then a return to
the steady state requires a decrease in the wage bill for production relative to
that of research. This can only be accomplished by a drop in wx relative to wn.
Alternatively, if L/Lx > Λ#, then the wage rate for researchers is too high relative
to wage rate for production workers. The second line in ﬁgure 8 shows how wages
adjust to a change in σ.
Above we have ﬁrst established the eﬀect of a change in σ on job choice keeping
wage rates constant. Second, we have established the eﬀect of a change in σ on
the wage rates assuming that workers choose their jobs optimally. Combining the
two eﬀects allows us to analyze the overall comparative static eﬀects of a rise in
σ. As we rely on equation 14 for the analysis of wage adjustment, we will have to
start with analyzing the ‘skill’ eﬀect before we can turn to the ‘wage’ eﬀect. The
overall comparative static eﬀects are summarized in ﬁgure 9. The ‘skill’ eﬀect is
shown on the ﬁrst line, which is identical to ﬁgure 7. The second line shows the
‘wage’ eﬀect assuming that the ‘skill’ eﬀect has already taken place.
The three dashed arrows represent three scenario’s for arriving at a new steady
state when inequality increases. The leftmost arrow shows the response of worker
Lx if a large part of the workforce is employed in research. First, worker Lx
ﬁnds out that his skill level is lower, which induces him to take a production job.


























become a researcher. Which of the two eﬀects is dominant depends on the precise
parameter values. The rightmost arrow describes the opposite situation. Worker
Lx experiences a rise in skills and decides to do research. The second worker Lx
sees a rise in wx/wn and takes a production job.
The middle arrow shows a situation in which the ‘skill’ and the ‘wage’ eﬀects





< Lx/L < Λ# like in ﬁgure 9, higher
inequality will cause the proportion of researchers in the workforce to increase. If





, then the shift will be towards production.
As discussed in the introduction, ﬁgures 1 and 3 show that the rise in the
proportion of researchers has coincided with a decline in schooling inequality. In
the model a more equal distribution of educational attainment can be simulated by
lowering σ. Figure 10 summarizes the eﬀects of a decline in σ on the proportion of
researchers. Not surprisingly, the ﬁgure is a ‘mirror image’ of ﬁgure 9 as all eﬀects
work exactly in the opposite direction. Assuming it is appropriate to consider the
proportion of researchers in OECD countries to be ‘small’ (meaning Lx/L > Λ#),
the model is able to explain how a reduction in schooling inequality can lead to
a rising proportion of researchers.4 In particular, the comparative static analysis
demonstrates that a continuously rising proportion of researchers can be a property
of an economy that is in the steady state. A growing proportion of researchers need
not be a transitional eﬀect if schooling inequality is also continuously declining.
Of course, this can only be true if the ‘skill’ eﬀect is smaller than the ‘wage’ eﬀect.
On the rightmost part of the domain sketched in ﬁgure 10 the model yields the
prediction that a more equal skill distribution raises the wage rate for researcher
relative to that of production workers. This result comes very close to what
Acemoglu (1998) calls the ‘strong induced-bias hypothesis’: “... directed technical
change can make the long-run relative demand curve [for skilled labor] slope up.”
(p. 783). Of course, the model presented here diﬀers in one important respect
from Acemoglu’s approach: it does not involve skill-biased technical change!

































Figure 10. Job choice by worker Lx in response to a decline in inequality: skill





















Figure 11. Product variety in the steady state
Having analyzed the eﬀects of schooling inequality on the proportion of pro-
duction workers, what remains to be done is the analysis of the eﬀects on product
variety. Equation 29 shows that λ∗ depends on σ both directly and indirectly
through Λ∗. The direct eﬀect is due to a change in the average productivity of
researchers and is given by the partial derivative of λ∗ with respect to σ. Unfor-



























Figure 11 shows the domain of Λ∗ for which a rise in σ has a positive direct
eﬀect on product variety per capita (∂λ∗/∂σ < 0) and the domain for which the
direct eﬀect is negative (∂λ∗/∂σ > 0).
The indirect eﬀect depends on how Λ∗ is aﬀected by σ. We have seen above
that this relationship is quite complex. Once we know the change in Λ∗, however,
remaining part of the analysis is straightforward as ∂λ∗/∂Λ∗ is always positive.
This follows directly from the fact that a larger number of researchers invent a
greater number of new products as equation 29 is just a reformulation of ˙ n = Hn.
5As equation 45 is similar to equation 43, it is possible to ﬁnd the condition under which
Λ# < Λ∗#. This condition turns out to be σ <
β−α
α(1−β).
16We have noted before that schooling inequality has declined in the OECD,
while the proportion of researchers has risen. Given these facts, the model predicts
that the total eﬀect of the decline in schooling inequality on product variety per
capita has probably been positive, provided that the direct eﬀect on λ∗ is not too
strong if positive.
5 Concluding remarks
It has been demonstrated how economic growth can be aﬀected by changes in
the distribution of skills and by growth in the level of education. Although the
speciﬁcation of the model outlined above is still fairly simple, it has proved to
be diﬃcult to draw some general conclusions about the eﬀects of a change in the
shape of the skill distribution. A closed form solution has been found for the steady
state, but whether the inﬂuence of a change in schooling inequality on welfare and
the share of researchers in the workforce is positive or negative, depends entirely
on parameter settings. For certain parameter settings, the model does provide
an explanation for some empirical trends. The model shows that a reduction in
schooling inequality might raise the proportion of researchers in the workforce,
while the wage rate for researchers rises relative to that for production workers.
Advances in schooling induce economic growth, not only in the trivial way of
raising a worker’s productivity, but also because it stimulates research in the same
way as population growth does. Because of the latter eﬀect, consumption per
capita grows at a higher rate than the productivity of production workers does.
A Endogenous skill growth
The assumption that the average level of skills grows at an exogenous and constant
rate, ˆ s = gs > 0, has been made for analytical convenience. However, in real life
education is not free and therefore growth in skills requires growth in resources
devoted to education. This appendix discusses two cases for which constant growth
in average skills is feasible in the steady state.
In order to avoid notational changes in the model assume that the population,
P, consists of the normal workforce, L, and the part of the population being a
teacher or student, Ps (P = Ps + L). Furthermore, suppose that the change
in average skills is aﬀected by the amount of human capital per capita that is
available for education, Hs/P, and by a discount factor, δ. In particular, the
change in average skills is given by ˙ s = Hs/P − δs. Human capital depends
on the people involved in education activities and on their average education,
which is assumed to equal that of the population: Hs = sεPs. (Better educated
teachers will teach more eﬀectively; better educated students will learn quicker.)
Substituting for Hs and dividing by s gives an expression for ˆ s.




17Deﬁne Λs ≡ Ps/P and take the growth rate of (ˆ s + δ) to get
dln(ˆ s + δ)/dt = (ε − 1) ˆ s + ˆ Λs. (47)
This last expression implies that there can be two speciﬁcations that allow for
a constant and positive growth rate of skills in the steady state. First, ε = 1
in combination with ˆ Ps = ˆ P yields gs = Λ∗
s − δ. With this speciﬁcation, skill
growth stems entirely from the positive eﬀect of skills as an input on skills as an
output, while the proportion of people involved in education remains constant.
This speciﬁcation has been proposed by Lucas (1988) and Rosen (1976).
Second, if ε < 1, dln(ˆ s + δ)/dt will go to zero as time proceeds. Setting
dln(ˆ s + δ)/dt = 0 yields ˆ s = 1
1−εˆ Λs. Steady state skill growth can only be
positive if the proportion of the population active in education is growing, but
for this proportion to grow at a constant rate, the population should grow at
a diﬀerent rate than the workforce. If both ˆ Λs and ˆ L are to be constant, the
population should grow according to ˆ P = gΛs
Ps
L + gL.
The results presented above demonstrate that the growth rate of skills can
be positive and constant in the steady state, but only under very restrictive as-
sumptions. A more detailed and general treatment of the eﬀects of schooling on
economic growth is given by Bils and Klenow (2000).
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